The “enemy” is only a relevant category in the context of a material conflict between opposing forces, that is, in relation to the dynamics of a particular structure, in a particular space, at a particular time. These concrete dynamics should dictate how, where, and when we fight.
Unfortunately, revolutionary politics are often more defined by rhetoric, ideological posturing, and sectarianism, than by tactical engagement, strategic thinking, and methodological rigor. Activists will affirm a set of political goals—abolition of the police, prisons, and the military, the overthrow of racism and patriarchy, the elimination of capitalism—but the strategic analysis and tactical capacity necessary to carry out these goals are either lacking or non-existent. In other words, the ideological value of politics is emphasized over their actual usefulness on the terrain of material conflict.
The process of strategic formulation thus becomes inverted—strategy is formed and rationalized according to pre-chosen ideological principles, rather than serious contextual analysis. In other words, strategy is formulated and tactics are employed in order to promote values and ideology, regardless of whether the strategy and tactics suit the circumstances for successfully disrupting the enemy’s operations or not. Under this inverted model, strategy is dictated by ideology, and the analysis is merely an ex post facto justification of preconceived ideas about the role of the tactics used.
Ideology itself is not the problem here. Ideology always influences how we define and frame our political objectives, as well as how we design and implement a strategy for fulfilling those objectives. The problem arises, however, when ideological symbolism is placed ahead of strategic analysis and tactical capacity.
In summary, the process of strategic formulation should unfold in the following way:
- Ideology → 2. Analysis → 3. Strategy
1. Ideology. Basic political motivations and the definition of objectives (intermediary and long term).
2. Analysis. Evaluation of the usefulness of tactics given the context.
3. Strategy. Employment of tactics based on a strategic analysis.
Instead, this process of strategic formulation is inverted, like so:
- Ideology → 2. Strategy → 3. Analysis
1. Ideology. Basic political motivations and objectives.
2. Strategy. Employment of tactics to suit the ideology, not the circumstances of struggle.
3. Analysis. Retrospective rationalization of tactics.
This inversion usually happens unintentionally, at the unconscious level. Rarely do political actors deliberately misapply their strategy. Moreover, it is sometimes the case that a properly formulated strategy can accomplish its objectives in one phase of a struggle, while as time goes on, the strategy becomes less effective. Oftentimes, the ideological absolutism and rigidity of “revolutionary” politics prevent initially sound strategies from flexibly adapting to the changing nature of the struggle.
In conclusion, we cannot obtain our revolutionary objectives by using a strategic paradigm which tends to function as a self-rationalizing mechanism. Instead, we need to start by investigating and analyzing the material terrain of struggle in a given region, and then develop a strategy and set of tactics that suits the given conditions of struggle. Otherwise we cannot adapt our tactics to the existing material circumstances, and as a result, interventions will take place externally to the inner movement of the struggle.